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This  paper  is  about  the  principles  of    proper  governance  codes,  which  even  tough  have 
blossomed in all parts of the world for more than a decade, the degree in which companies adopt 
the  codes  vary  in  different  countries,  and  the  decision  to  adopt  a  certain  code  does  not 
automatically  guarranty  efficient  corporate  governance.    The  paper  trys  to  identify  the 
mechanisms needed for implementing the codes and that will lead to higher efficiency. 
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1.Introduction. 
In 1978 the first country which issued a code of proper governance was the United States, the 
second country was Hong Kong in 1989, then the pace of issuance increased, especially after 
1992 when the UK Cadbury Report was issued. By mid 2008, in 30 years, 64 countries have 
issued 196 separate codes of proper governance, some countries having more than one code of 
proper governance (The most notable being the United Kingdom and the United States with 25 
codes each) others having only one code (such as Argentina or Austria) issuers of which are joint 
investors, employers associations, professional associations and governments, stock markets and 
their regulators
381. It seems that there is a link between the development of capital markets and 
the number of codes issued. Countries with capital markets not only larger but deeper, have more 
codes of proper governance, proper governance need increases with increasing numbers of public 
firms  because  agency  problems  occur  between  dispersed  owners,  and  managers  or  between 
majority and minority shareholders. Spreading codes for proper governance in the world was 
aided  by  stimulating  international  entities  such  as  the  World  Bank  and  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD),  which  began  to  emphasize  the  need  to 
improve corporate governance institutions in general and in particular to help countries to grow 
and develop. 
 
2. General principles. 
General principles of proper governance structure refers to: a balance between executive and 
non-executive  directors,  a  clear  division  of  responsibilities  between  the  chairman  and  chief 
executive, need to provide timely and quality information to management, formal and transparent 
procedure for appointment of new executives, balanced and understandable financial reporting 
and internal control system to maintain a good quality. 
 On how the codes are implemented once are developed and adopted as a guiding principle of 
government has identified two mechanisms for implementing the code - mandatory or voluntary 
regulation.  Classic  examples  of  two  alternative  approaches  to  implement  codes  are  law-for 
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example, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the U.S. and an approach “to comply or explain”-for 
example, the UK Combined Code in 2003. Although most of Proper governance Codes have 
similar problems, the specific content of codes for proper governance varies significantly across 
countries, by capturing the needs of different corporate governance systems. Implementation of 
codes increased over time, firms tend to adopt a growing percentage of codes recommendations 
despite their voluntary nature. 
Although proper governance codes have been developed worldwide for more than a decade, the 
extents to which companies adopt codes vary across countries, and the decision to adopt a code 
does  not  give  an  automaticall  guarantee  of  effective  corporate  governance.  Thus  in  the  UK 
British  companies  listed  on  London  Stock  Exchange  met  to  a  large  extent  Cadbury  Report 
recommendations, the degree of compliance with the UK Combined Code is developing over 
time. Regarding the assessment of compliance with the provisions of the German Code of Proper 
governance for a significant proportion of companies complying with these provisions, almost 
half of them are already implementing the full German Code as the company’s guiding principle. 
Extending the analysis shows a high level of acceptance of recommendations of codes and a 
marked willingness to comply in the future, institutional environment and, in particular, capital 
market development resulting in large part the degree of monitoring compliance with the code, 
even if just for informal and legitimation. 
 
3. Experiences regarding corporate governance. 
All studies of proper governance stress the importance and growing interest shown for this area. 
Codes of proper governance became a central issue in politics and scientific research. To a fad 
that would disappear once the new ideas appear, codes of proper governance have increased 
relevance  and  continue  to  spread  worldwide.  Has  also  made  a  considerable  progress  on 
understanding the various code of proper governance worldwide, companies adopting codes, and 
code impact on performance. 
From what was shown most codes tend to agree with the mechanisms that support more effective 
governance, and Board with independent members and the creation of committees, however, 
cross-national differences are significant. For example, the codes vary greatly because they are 
developed  to  address  corporate  governance  issues  that  are  specific  to  a  particular  country. 
Whereas  such  codes  issued  in  different  countries  actually  have  different  recommendations, 
comparing their adoption and effectiveness in improving corporate governance throughout the 
country faces severe limitations because it used different standards. 
Another interesting aspect is that the issuers would outline codes; codes are issued by the stock 
exchange of countries, executives of associations, employers associations, investors and investor 
associations,  professional  associations  or  governments.  These  different  types  of  issuers  have 
different objectives and therefore codes that will create separate targets. Thus, recommendations 
on  best  practice  Board  considered  the  behavior  largely  dependent  on  the  issuer.  Similar 
applicability of proper governance vary dramatically as issuers, speaking directly to the debate 
between the effectiveness of regulations mild versus harsh legislation. The government and the 
stock exchanges have the power to impose penalties for non-compliance practices. In contrast, 
investors and investor associations have only the power to impose practices through shareholder 
activism at meetings, while other borrowers - associations of principals, professional associations 
and  employers  associations  -  have  a  limited  ability  to  persuade  companies  to  follow  the 
recommendations codes. 
It  should  not  be  neglected  the  importance  of  transnational  institutions  for  the  creation  and 
dissemination of proper governance. Such transnational institutions like the World Bank and 
OECD have actively promoted proper governance by helping developing countries understand 
how to improve corporate governance practices. These trans-national issuers by promoting a 
common set of practice, regardless of country characteristics, may indirectly contribute to the 580 
 
convergence  of  codes  across  national  governance  practices.  In  other  words,  it  moves  to  a 
particular model of corporate governance (eg, Anglo-Saxon or Continental), but to a model of 
governance more generally global. 
It  must  be  noted  that  the  recommendations  contained  in  Codes  of  proper  governance  have 
evolved  over  time  as  some  corporate  governance  issues  are  resolved  other  problems  occur 
instead. This development problem that the codes treat was treated with revision of previous 
codes  and  new  codes  addressing  governance  issues  new  and  different.  This  co-evolution  of 
corporate governance issues and content codes emphasizes another source of differences across 
countries  and  codes  developed  in each  country.  Countries  with sophisticated capital  markets 
require  more  advanced  codes  recommendations,  while  countries  with  small  capital  markets 
probably require simpler code addressing basic problems. 
Research concerns the causes of corporate failures after the crisis of the `80 in Britain, manifested 
by Sir Adrian Cadbury, have resulted in the Cadbury Report in 1992. Subsequently, other reports 
have  come  in  support  of  Lord  Sir  Adrian  Cadbury  Report,  outlining  the  idea  of  critical 
weaknesses  that  manifest  themselves  in  top  management.  Cadbury  Code,  issued  in  1992, 
established the first basic rules of running a company take the form of 19 recommendations to 
achieve increased efficiency while nediscrimonatoriu behavior to shareholders.  
The  Paul  Rutteman  report  was  published  in  1993  that  consider  how  to  implement  the 
recommendations of Cadbury, concluding that any stock exchange listed company should report 
on internal control. 
Published standards of public life by Lord Nolan in 1994 reiterate the need for developing an 
ethical public sector; Nolan code representing a solid set of seven principles that should guide 
public life. 
Richard Greenbury report in 1995 contained a code of proper practice wage determination and 
disclosure of directors, while establishing the need for a remuneration committee, to avoid poor 
performance and even establish compensation mechanisms for their enforcement. In the same 
year Ronnie Hampel report was to amend and improve certain references from Cadbury Report 
on the structure of boards, the role of director’s nonexecutive role of shareholders.  
Based  on  the  recommendations  provided  by  the  Cadbury  report  and  other  observations  on 
corporate  governance,  published  in  1998  the  combined  code  has  become  a  mandatory 
requirement for listed companies’ shares. 
Charlie Mc Creevy launches the „explain or apply principle”, that companies are obliged to 
justify any deviation from corporate governance codes. 
In October 1998 the finance ministries of member countries of the G7 called for transparency, 
quality,  consistency  and  comparability  of  information  on  capital  markets,  bringing  the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in collaboration with the 
international regulatory bodies to complete by May 1999 drawing up a code of principles for 
sound management of firms. In 1999 the OECD published its corporate governance principles, 
recognized by the Financial Stability Forum as one sin the 12 basic standards for sound financial 
systems. These principles formed an essential part of the Collection of Standards and Codes 
conducted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. International Organization of 
Securities  Commissions  with  other  private  sector  bodies  as  the  International  Corporate 
Governance Network (ICGN International Corporate Governance Network) has adopted these 
principles. In addition to many national codes on corporate governance principles have been a 
reference point. Revision of OECD principles made in 2004, was born from the need to adapt to 
economic and political change, following consultations with officials and non-OECD countries, 
members of various professional bodies and business representatives from trade unions and civil 581 
 
society,  additions  being  particularly  information  related  to  transparency  and  board 
responsibilities and remuneration of the administration board
382.  
Corporate governance systems have specific features of developing economies how they apply 
their culture. Thus, if German corporate governance model is based on the internal control system 
is centered on the existence of strong shareholders, based on high concentration of capital, as 
manifested by shareholders that are linked by common corporate interests, while at the same time 
take part in both its management and control („insiders”), being focused on the banking system, 
banks exercising strong influence and control over the companies, in contrast to Anglo-Saxon 
model is characterized by dispersion of capital, the chief financier stock market, transparency of 
information,  lack  of  involvement  of  public  authorities  in  the  economic  environment,  the 
significant  role  of  accounting  existence  of  a  stable  economic  environment,  high  levels  of 
liquidity, customary law system, common law.         
Corporate governance system in North America is a traditional model that is based on three 
levels and two legal relationships: a legal relationship is established between shareholders and 
directors,  under  a  contract  of  mandate  (agency  in  common  law)  and  the  second  is  legal 
established between directors and managers, managers have the authority derived from that of 
administrators In this model, called model maximizing shareholder income, the entire company is 
focused on risk capital provider, which is also the residual income claimant. Shareholders select 
the board of the Company. Decision making system based on: Actions means a vote and elect 
management board decisions are assumed to maximize the value of shares held by shareholders. 
Share value is based on the present value of the projection of future dividends, the net profit 
derived. These models to Japanese corporate governance system is distinguished by its features, 
the main feature being that the groups of „keiretsu” - groups representing economic results from 
the combination of several companies through cross holdings (English cross equity) firms within 
the  meaning  representation  Grouping  the  boards  of  other  entities
383,  containing  one  or  more 
central entities (eng.core members) class with small affiliated companies. Characteristic of these 
types of groups is given multidimensional cooperation between entities that are part of the pool. 
In this context frequently encounter dialing mechanisms for funding the banking entity in the 
group, or to transfer employees from the same landing value of the group, or the existence of an 
entity specializing in the marketing of products made in the group (specifically trade houses 
called Japanese „sogo sosha”) observing the strong influence of Japanese culture. 
Examination of issues of corporate governance convergence is both relevant and necessary, is 
interesting  to  study  the  principles  that  can  justify,  primarily  Anglo-American  model,  with  a 
shareholder orientation and the foreign financing and, secondly, the continental European model 
Japanese and characterized by a greater orientation toward policy makers and funding from the 
inside. 
Convergence of corporate governance refers to the tendency of corporate governance models, 
specifically  national  or  supranational,  to  merge  their  practices  and  theoretical  perspectives. 
Complete  convergence  implies  that  national  differences  would  disappear  and  eventually  a 
universal model of corporate governance be adopted. 
Although there argue that convergence is manifested by the Anglo-American model, these voices 
argue, would be superior to its alternatives, the specific failures of the Anglo-American corporate 
governance, corporate success in the party concerned, interior-oriented systems and economic 
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development in regions outside the Anglo-American states that would be difficult to transfer to a 
private practice of corporate governance from one context to another and expect ca aceasta s￿ 
func￿ioneze eficient. Also introducing mechanisms such as the U.S. takeover of management 
discipline in Germany or Japan would be extremely disruptive for managerial incentives and 
screening systems present there. 
Although manifestations of convergence differences remain for decades, the trend is to consider globalization 
as a convergence of corporate governance. Arguments both pro and against convergence there certainly is 
that, in essence, although convergence would create the conditions for efficiency should be based on the need 
for diversity. Other factors outside the economic legal and they are in deeper social norms underlying various 
governance structures. Thus culture is beyond the law and economic systems, cultural diversity 
teaching against convergence. Model of corporate governance around the world have drawn as 
culture to give a much more accurate and useful. However, the idea that legal structures and 
economic rules that the Constitution corporate governance systems are the culture, and therefore 
justified  the  possibility  that  corporate  governance  models  differ  between  cultures,  could  be 
related to cultural relativism. As far as cultural relativism claims that different values may be held 
by different groups, it involves imposing constraints on the values of a group to another group. 
This concept is closely related to the actions and arguments of moral relativism that works, 
however, at both individual, and group (cultural and / or national). 
We can identify in corporate governance, above legal and economic structures, a set of values, 
attitudes and / or fundamental beliefs. Understanding this basic morality may therefore provide 
penetration into corporate governance structures, moral principles and philosophies that can be 
most easily identified with the most prominent models of corporate governance from the Anglo-
American model, followed by continental and Japanees models. 
Not  be  said  that  corporate  governance  failures  necessarily  follow  these  patterns  in  Anglo-
American or European countries - there are too many differences between companies and the 
above theoretical discussion was limited to traditional extremes. Yet in some ways, the morality 
that underpins corporate governance can be seen now in successful companies. Although specific 
reference to corporate governance annual reports focus specifically on issues management, there 
are other aspects of these reports involve broader perspective on corporate governance.  
We can conclude that business and morality are not always considered ordinary partners. Few 
would suggest, however, that business relations would be possible without some minimum of 
trust and fairness. Similarly, it is not unreasonable to argue that directors have certain moral 
obligations to those who provide funding, regardless of their legal requirements and enforcement 
capacities. In turn, the corporation may be seen as a mechanism that contributed significantly to 
society  in  the  past  and  has  the  potential  to  continue  to  do  so,  all  over  the  world.  Despite 
differences  in  approaches  to  both  theoretical  and  the  practical  application  of  corporate 
governance in different jurisdictions, there is a certain extent a common morality of corporate 
governance. Successful operation of the corporations is generally considered beneficial because it 
provides  different  socio-economic  „goods”.  The  four  „virtues”  of  corporate  governance 
responsibility, accountability, clarity and transparency are accepted as characteristics of good 
corporate governance not only in the 30 OECD countries, but in others as well. 
A  closer examination  of the  principles that  support  corporate  governance  patterns  prevailing 
Anglo-American  and  the  Continental  European  /  Japanese  suggests  that  differences  in  the 
relationship between corporations and society. Differences in underlying models of corporate 
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